


~~SECRET~~DCI/ICS-87-0838
30 April 1987*ente 19-SR*MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy Branch
Office of Security

ATTENTION:

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FROM:

Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office, IC Staff

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SUBJECT: Discrepancy in Use of Criteria Country Lists

1. During recent SCI Forum focus on possible revision of DCID 1/20, I did some shallow research on the manner in which different agencies and departments view the grouping of countries that they consider "hostile" or in some way threatening to our national security and to our personnel who hold security clearances and SCI accesses. As you may already be aware, there is no uniform agreement within government in identifying these countries. This is not intended to bring your office directly into our attempt to arrive at a list of countries to be considered dangerous for personnel holding SCI access.

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2. What I do want to accomplish is to inform you of some lack of uniformity within the Office of Security. The Industrial and Certification Branch, Clearance Division, is using a 1985 "Criteria Country" list compiled by the Attorney General's office (attachment A). This list is used as a basis for adjudication in investigations and waivers. Staff and Operations Branch, Clearance Division, is using the list of countries found in the attachment to DCID 1/20 (attachment B). A cursory review will reveal that the lists are not identical. Since DCID 1/14 is the standard against which both staffers and industrial contractors are adjudicated, it would seem reasonable and logical that both groups of persons would be adjudicated by the same basic criteria, with allowance recognized for the polygraph requirements.

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3. Special Activities Division admits to using the Attorney General's "Criteria Country" list in its work, but a spokesman quickly acknowledged that the list was not taken as a "final authority" in the considerations of that office. External Activities Branch uses DCID 1/20 as its guide in business relevant to its functions.

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Regraded CONFIDENTIAL when
removed from Secret attachment

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4. Both lists are of utility, and it goes without saying that the Agency can modify the official stance on any given countries dependent on changing circumstances in many arenas, including political and intelligence acquisition. The discrepancy cited in Clearance Division is presented for your consideration and any action you deem appropriate.

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Attachment:

a/s

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Distribution of DCI/ICS-87-0838:

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DCID 1/20-5

COUNTRIES AND AREAS IN WHICH VISITS, TRAVEL, AND
ASSIGNMENT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE A
HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY
Attachment to DCID 1/20
(Effective 11 March 1985)

Listed below are countries and areas in which there is deemed to be a risk to SCI resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation, or entrapment of persons who have, or who have had access to SCI. All territory controlled by the listed countries is included, irrespective of whether the national boundaries involved are formally recognized by the United States Government. The use of vessels owned or controlled by a country listed is also included.

Afghanistan
Albania
Angola
Bulgaria
Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea)
Chad
China (People's Republic of [includes Tibet])
Cuba (except U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo)
Czechoslovakia
El Salvador
Ethiopia
German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
Guyana
Hungary
Iran
Iraq
Laos
Lebanon
Libyan Arab Republic
Nicaragua
North Korea (and adjacent Demilitarized Zone)
Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic)
Poland
Romania
South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen)
Soviet Sector of Berlin (East Berlin)
Syria
USSR
Vietnam
Yugoslavia

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